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Collusion and Conversation in Educational Research 
 
NAOMI HODGSON 
Institute of Education, University of London, UK 
 
This article considers how the standardisation of language in current education policy and 
practice, and in educational research, effects a repression of language and thought. The article 
then seeks to outline how we might resist this. The article takes up Paul Standish’s suggestion 
that educational research colludes in the repression of language, and therefore of thought, that is 
effected in part through policy-borrowing and the global dominance of the English language. 
Standish refers in particular to the rhetoric of social justice. This article considers the narrative 
research methodologies often employed in the name of social justice and the ways in which the 
accompanying notions of voice, dialogue, and conversation fail to provide a critique of current 
policy and practice. Rather, they further entrench the discourses that repress language and 
thought. With reference to Stanley Cavell’s notion of ‘conversation’ and Bruno Latour’s notion 
of ‘composition’, the article discusses how we might proceed otherwise, exploring a mode of 





Standardisation is now a common feature of transnational policy. One example can be found, for 
example, in the EU’s statement of ‘competences supporting lifelong learning’, which states the need 
for a ‘common language’ (OJEU, 2010, p. 2) of education, training, and work, thus ensuring 
transparency, and removing the need for translation. A further example of this is the European 
Qualifications Framework, which has standardised the level of qualifications between countries. This 
ensures that educational attainment is recognised and thereby transferable between EU member state 
countries to enable mobility of persons and comparability of national performance. Also, as part of 
this general trend, research methods training has become streamlined and standardised in order to 
ensure all those pursuing postgraduate study have been similarly inducted into what it means to be a 
researcher today, and prepared for their research career in terms of the possible methods and 
methodologies available. Such standardisation ensures a parity between educational policies and 
practices in member states of the EU as it seeks to enable mobility and productivity, and thereby its 
competitiveness in the global knowledge economy. But there is also another side to this, in which the 
openness and transparency that such common modes of accountability seek to provide, closes down 
other possibilities. 
  Recent analyses have illustrated how policies relating to citizenship, lifelong learning, and 
intercultural dialogue in Europe today inculcate the individual into a language of culture, citizenship, 
and democracy that is depoliticized, aimed as they are at consensus and conflict avoidance (Biesta, 
2009; Hodgson, 2011). This is evident in the discourse of voice, narrative, and dialogue prevalent in 
current policy (Hodgson, 2012). This depoliticised rendering of democracy and citizenship, 
elsewhere referred to as the governmentalisation of democracy (Simons & Masschelein, 2010) can be 
said to deny disagreement and conflict as inherent aspects of political life, particularly in the way it 
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seeks to standardise the language in which dialogue takes place (see Hodgson, 2012). The 
technologies that exist to account for citizenship and democracy, and in the name of which we are 
asked to account for ourselves, effect a form of immunisation (Masschelein and Simons, 2002). That 
is to say that the governmentalisation of the notion of voice and our relationships to others denies the 
very nature of subjectivity, constituted in our exposure to and answerability to the other. 
  In a recent paper, presented at Kyoto University, Paul Standish raised the question of whether 
educational research colludes in a form of repression of thought and expression due to the language it 
uses and, moreover, fails to question (Standish, 2012)*. Standish illustrates how a repression takes 
place through practices of policy-borrowing and the global domination of English, which leads to a 
standardisation of language. Standish illustrated this in particular with reference to the way in which 
the notion of social justice is used.  
  The notions of voice and social justice are prevalent in the field of educational research where they 
are used to provide a critique of current policy and practice. Educational research concerned with 
social justice often employs particular methodologies concerned with voice and identity̶e.g. life 
history, narrative research̶and is often shaped by a particular politics̶of emancipation, of 
recognition, the politics of identity̶that shapes the reading of the philosophical texts on which such 
methodologies are based (Hodgson and Standish, 2009). As argued elsewhere, the manner of the use 
of poststructuralism in work concerned with identity politics suggests a reluctance to let go of the 
stable human subject (Mayo, 2000). Analysis therefore takes place at the level of the identity category 
according to which the subject is identified (e.g. race, gender, sexuality) in order that the individual 
voices their own experience of that categorisation as a form and means of gaining social justice. The 
understanding of poststructuralism in educational research places the subject as central, as it is the site 
of rights, justice, voice, and identity. As such, rather than disrupt the dominant mode of 
subjectivation (Foucault, 1986, 2005), this serves only to shore up a particular identity, one that 
answers to the demands to account for ourselves in particular ways (Hodgson, 2009). 
  Research for social justice often employs an understanding of narrative, then, that does not disrupt 
the commonplace ways in which we are asked to account for ourselves in education today e. g. 
through learner profiles, as reflective practitioners, or in the concern with the researcher’s positionality. 
Such research often fits our expectations of narrative, of a learning journey, with particular outcomes 
at the end: a more certain identity, a step towards an ideal self, the realisation of one’s true potential.  
  In this article, I will take up Bruno Latour’s notion of ‘composition’ (Latour, 2010) to argue that 
this mode of thinking about voice and social justice are characteristic of an orthodoxy of critique in 
educational research that is not sufficient to grasp the reality in which we live today. The concern 
with social justice that informs the use of narrative research methods seems, on Latour’s account, to 
derive from the conditions of another time̶‘the time of time’̶and thus fails to gain critical 
purchase today. The emancipatory politics underlying critical research in this vein is predicated on a 
particular notion of human progress that, arguably, no longer applies. Furthermore, such orthodoxies 
further entrench the monolingual mode of speaking about education and the human subject that 
Paul Standish draws our attention to. 
  Against this background of the standardisation of language in policy and the collusion of education 
in this, I wish to consider how we might proceed otherwise. That is, I wish to address the question of 
how we as academics̶or students, or teachers, or citizens̶can proceed in the face of current 
conditions, in the name of education and democracy, when any certainty about the meaning of these 
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terms seems to be lost.  
  Before turning to Latour, I will draw on Standish’s discussion of Stanley Cavell’s use of the term 
‘conversation’ (Standish, 2012). In contrast to the language of education policy and research, which 
seeks cooperation, and is constitutive of the immunisation and governmentalisation identified above, 
Cavell’s nuanced use of the term acknowledges its inherent instability, and thus acknowledges this to 
be a feature of human subjectivity.  
  I will begin by recounting Standish’s discussion of Cavell’s disagreement with John Rawls over the 
notion of co-operation in relation to social justice and democracy. The notions of voice and 
conversation that emerge form part of a rich understanding of their role in the constitution of 
subjectivity and of democracy. Discussing this alongside the work of Latour begins to suggest an 
understanding of research that does not collude in the current discourses and practices of 
standardisation and thus resists the depoliticising that is effected in policy and practice and the 





Paul Standish draws attention to Cavell’s critique of John Rawls’ emphasis on cooperation, in 
particular due to the influence of Rawlsian political liberalism in thinking about justice in education: 
 
‘Cooperation’, as a general state of social interaction, suggests the idea of society as a whole 
either as having a project or, at the other extreme, as being a neutral field in which each can 
pursue his or her own projects. Intuitively these extremes are analogous to aspects of the 
interesting institution of competitive games.  
  The idea of ‘conversation’, in contrast, emphasizes neither a given social project nor a 
field of fairness for individual projects. (Nor, as I have insisted, does it deny the importance 
of these ideas.) (Cavell, 2004, pp. 173-174 cited in Standish, 2012). 
 
Conversation, then, Standish writes, is ‘the field within which I might discover what my projects 
might be’ (Standish, 2012). There is a finality in the notion of cooperation that Cavell objects to. 
Cooperation implies reaching a consensus, and further that there is a notion or state of justice or 
democracy towards which we are working. The notion of conversation indicates something more 
immanent, and continual.  
Standish draws attention to the particular nuance of the term ‘conversation’ in Cavell’s work:  
 
Cavell finds in the second syllable of ‘conversation’ (‘-vers-’̶cf. reversal, diversion, averse) 
the suggestion of a turning of thought such that it cannot proceed solely, and in many 
respects does not proceed best, when it travels along straight, systematic lines: openness to 
conversation, a readiness to be turned (to be shaped, fashioned, sometimes diverted, 
sometimes rebuffed), require that I do not seek to shore up my own identity but rather am 
ready for new possibilities̶that is, ready to become (Standish, 2012). 
 
The notion of conversation in Cavell’s work admits the exposure and answerability inherent in our 
condition of living together, and is shaped by his Emersonian moral perfectionism. Here, a further 
distinction between conversation and Rawls’ notion of cooperation appears. Rawls takes 
perfectionism to be a teleological doctrine (Cavell, 1990, p. xviii; Rawls, 2005, p. 326). On Rawls’ 
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account, perfectionism is inherently elitist, as it seeks excellence, and therefore advantages the few, 
and so works against the demands of justice and democracy (Cavell, 1990, p. 3). Cavell counters this 
and seeks to show why any theory of justice must accommodate perfectionism if it is to be a human 
account: ‘I find Emerson’s version of perfectionism to be essential to the criticism of democracy from 
within… Emersonian Perfectionism does not imply perfectibility̶nothing in Emerson is more 
constant than his scorn of the idea that any given state of what he calls the self is the last’ (ibid.). 
Perfectionism holds democracy̶as well as education, and one’s self̶to be always still to come, 
rejecting not only the possibility, but also the morality, of perfectibility. The critique of democratic 
society comes not from comparison with a utopian ideal, then, but entails our attending to the 
constitution of democracy today. This entails also attending to my role in this. As Naoko Saito states, 





The discourse of Rawlsian political liberalism is one of two elaborations that Paul Standish identifies 
as being ‘apt discursively to determine educational thought’ about matters of social justice (Standish, 
2012). The other derives from a neo-Marxist politics of emancipation, as often found in critical 
pedagogy. There is, then, a Utopian aspect to this: given a voice and due recognition each individual 
will live freely and equally. Bruno Latour (Latour, 2010) seems to suggest, however, that the 
emancipatory politics that underpin critique in this vein no longer gain any purchase on reality, and 
that the transcendent, utopian idea of justice sought no longer has any critical force. I will recount 
Latour’s notion of ‘composition’ here before indicating how this relates to the notion of conversation 
in Cavell’s work, and then considering how we might proceed in light of these accounts. 
Latour associates the transcendent, utopian understanding of human existence and its future with 
‘the time of time’ (Latour, 2010, p. 472). It is an understanding characteristic of the modern period, 
and one which is aptly illustrated by shifts in the understanding of the individual and society in 
relation to education, as elaborated by Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein (2008). They identify a 
shift in the conception of time and space from the historical self-understanding structured by a fixed, 
linear history and a utopian notion of societal destiny operative in the modern period, to an 
environmental self-understanding prevalent today (p. 697). The reconceptualisation of space as 
‘environments’ (as in for example the learning environment, or the work environment) stresses our 
relationship to the ‘here and now’:  
 
To regard oneself as inhabiting an environment implies that one’s self-understanding is 
focused on present capacities and opportunities to meet present challenges and needs. Of 
paramount importance are the capacities and resources that one has at one’s disposal and 
therefore it is indispensable to have transparent and up-to-date information on what is 
available here and now. This environmental self-understanding implies a particular 
conception of the past and the future (p. 695). 
 
The historical self-understanding existed in the evolutionary understanding of progress constitutive of 
the modern self, as standing separate from history and situated within a historical process, a 
teleological story of emancipation and progress, ‘towards a glorious future’ (p. 696). In an 
environmental self-understanding, a teleological narrative within a fixed temporality is displaced by 
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the permanent confrontation by conditions to which we are asked to adapt and to take responsibility. 
It demands a permanent reorientation of oneself within one’s environment in response to the 
resources available. 
The narrative of progress of the modern period, Latour writes, ‘was predicated on the idea that the 
flow of time has one̶and only one̶inevitable and irreversible direction’, and on the ‘inevitable 
march of progress’ (p. 472). The mode of critique that engendered such progress then is no longer 
sufficient for the current environmental self-understanding in which we are permanently responding 
and adapting to uncertain conditions in the name of entrepreneurial self-investment. Latour contrasts 
‘critique’, then, with the notion of ‘composition’: 
 
With critique, you may debunk, reveal, unveil, but only as long as you establish, through 
this process of creative destruction, a privileged access to the world of reality behind the 
veils of appearances. Critique, in other words, has all the limits of utopia: it relies on the 
certainty of the world beyond this world. By contrast for compositionism, there is no world 
beyond. It is all about immanence (p. 474). 
 
In setting out this notion he seeks to: 
 
[make] explicit (that is, manifest) a subtle but radical transformation in the definition of 
what it means to progress, that is, to process forward and meet new prospects. Not as a war 
cry for an avant-garde to move even further and faster ahead, but rather as a warning, a call 
to attention, so as to stop going further in the same way as before toward the future… It is as 
if we had to move from an idea of inevitable progress to one of tentative and precautionary 
progression. There is still a movement. Something is still going forward. But…the tenor is 
entirely different (p. 473).   
 
For compositionists, he writes, the ‘continuity of space and time is not given’, ‘they have to compose 
it, slowly and progressively. And, moreover, to compose it from discontinuous pieces’ (pp. 481-482). 
He writes: ‘We need to have a much more mundane, more immanent, much more realistic, much 
more embodied definition of the material world if we wish to compose a common world’ (p. 482). 
The term ‘compositionism’ ‘underlines that things have to be put together (Latin componere) while 
retaining their heterogeneity’ (Latour, 2010, p. 473). Latour connects this notion also with 
composure, and thus to art, painting, music, theatre, and dance; to compromise and compromising; 
and also to compost and decomposition (ibid.). Such work is painstaking, it demands an 





For Latour, we now face no future but many prospects, to be composed by ‘being firmly attentive to 
the task at hand’ (p. 484). This requires us ‘to care, to move slowly, with caution and precaution’ 
(ibid.). The mode, or ethics, of reading that Paul Standish calls for and that is evident in Cavell’s 
work attests to a humility in the face of things, an exposure to reality that permits us to be unsettled, 
and to make only tentative, speculative steps. It does not offer philosophy or theory of education as 
expertise. Cavell’s work offers a particular form of critique, then. In the practice of thought and 
writing itself he is attentive to the compromise that citizenship entails. His aversion to the idea of 
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cooperation is not only its sense of easy settlement but also the sense of compliance with historical 
principles of justice. Instead conversation is invoked as the necessary condition of our living together, 
predicated on listening and our answerability to the other. As Standish writes: 
 
Plainly this is to take conversation not as just any kind of verbal exchange between people 
but to idealise it as something to be aspired towards. And plainly, given that Emerson is 
never far from Cavell’s account, the readiness to be fashioned cannot be an acquiescence in 
conformity. Emerson says of conversation that its laws are ‘analogous to the laws of society’ 
and that it is the ‘first office of friendship’ (Emerson, 1961, p. 292), where the friend is not 
someone who merely reinforces my identity, who secures me where I am, but rather 
someone ready to challenge me towards my next, best possibility... It is in this spirit that 
Emerson advocates a kind of self-reliance, not as individualistic autonomy but as the kind 
of receptivity, openness, and resourcefulness that is achieved in the act of abandonment (see, 
for example, Saito, 2005, p. 147) (Standish, 2012). 
 
The sense of conversation here, shaped by Cavell’s Emersonian moral perfectionism chimes with the 
manner of composition. And education, in a particular sense, is inherent in both. As Standish and 
Saito capture it: ‘Education leads not so much upward, toward some kind of ethereal transcendence, 
as downward and back to the rough ground, with each new step we take, each moment of crisis, 
affording a new point d’appui’ (Standish and Saito, 2012, p. 7). 
  I do not intend here to try to fully align Paul Standish or Stanley Cavell position with that of 
Bruno Latour, but rather to show how they offer a release from the discourses that govern thinking 
and therefore research, discourses that form an international orthodoxy, responsive to the demands of 
policy and of competitiveness and comparability. As Paul Standish notes, the discourses of justice that 
pervade educational research can become ideological. The particular zeal with which social justice is 
pursued means that it becomes difficult to argue against. After all, poverty, persecution, and prejudice 
still abound. But, it seems we have decided what to do about this: education is always part of the 
solution. But yet, we also speak about the failure of education. It seems we are at a point at which 
previous (modern) certainties no longer apply. But yet, in educational research at least, they remain 
sacred. 
  The discussion here sought to explore texts that opened the way for thinking otherwise. They do 
not provide critique in the sense of teaching us how to proceed. But therein, I suggest, lies their 
critical force. They alert us to that which no longer applies and thus that unsettles our comfortable 
mode of response. They ask us to attend to ourselves in our critique as much as to the policy or 
practice we are addressing, by acknowledging that what we do does not stand outside of these things 
but is constitutive of them. They call on us not to ‘do’ research that seeks solutions in the pursuit of 





* Paul Standish’s paper was a Keynote paper at the 5th International Conference between the Graduate School of 
Education, Kyoto University and the Institute of Education, University of London. (Kyoto University, 
December 17, 2012) It was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Global COE (Center of Excellence) Programme 
(D07). 
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